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The sole plaintiff in the trial court and the appellant in 
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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by extending 
comity to the State of Florida and requiring that this lawsuit 
against Broward County, a political subdivision of the State of 
Florida, be pursued in Broward County, Florida, rather than Utah? 
The decision to extend comity and dismiss a complaint against 
a political subdivision of another state rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Jackett v. Los Angeles Dept. of 
Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1075, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Lee v. Miller County. 800 F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir. 1986); 
University of Iowa Press v. Urrea, 440 S.E.2d 203, 204-05 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 19 93), cert, denied (1994); Mianecki v. Second Judicial 
District Court, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1983), The trial court's 
decision is therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
2. Does Utah!s venue statute applicable to suits against a 
county (Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3) require that a suit against 
Broward County be brought in Broward County, Florida? 
This issue involves the interpretation and application of a 
statute, which an appellate court reviews for correctness. Jeffs 
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998). 
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in considering 
arguments that were properly included in Broward Countyfs reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss? 
This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Romrell v. 
Zions First Natfl Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980); Boyd 
v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
4. Does Florida law govern the parties' dispute, either 
because of a contractual choice of law provision or because the 
applicable conflict of laws analysis requires the application of 
Florida law? 
Whether the terms of a written contract form a valid and 
binding choice of law provision is a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. See Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Constr., 
Inc. , 1999 UT 69, SI 6, 983 P.2d 575. Whether the law of a foreign 
state is deemed to control under a conflict of laws analysis is 
also a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See 
American Nat!l Fire Ins. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 927 P.2d 186, 
199 (Utah 1996). 
5. Regardless of whether the substantive law of Florida or 
Utah applies to this lawsuit, did the trial court correctly dismiss 
this lawsuit, either because Utah's venue statute requires that a 
suit against Broward County be brought in Broward County, Florida, 
or because comity mandates that this case be pursued in Broward 
County, Florida? 
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The decision to extend comity and dismiss a complaint against 
a political subdivision of another state rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. The trial court's decision is 
therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jackett, 771 P.2d at 
1075, 1077; Lee, 800 F.2d at 1376; University of Iowa Press, 440 
S.E.2d at 204-05; Mianecki, 658 P„2d at 425, 
The trial court's interpretation and application of Utah's 
venue statute is reviewed for correctness. See JeffsF 970 P.2d at 
1240 (Utah 1998) . 
DETERMINATIVE CASE AND STATUTE 
A determinative--or strongly persuasive--case is Jackett v. 
Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (extending comity to the State of California and affirming 
dismissal of a Utah complaint against political subdivision of that 
state) . 
A determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3, which 
states, in relevant part, "An action against a county may be 
commenced and tried in such county . . . " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is a breach of contract action brought by Trillium 
against a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Broward 
County. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Trillium filed its complaint against Broward County on 
April 30, 1999. (R. 1.) Broward County filed a Motion to Dismiss 
on June 17, 1999. (R. 11.) In support of its Motion to Dismiss, 
Broward County argued (1) that Florida law applies to this action 
under a choice of law provision in the contract and under a choice 
of law analysis; and (2) that under Florida law, this case must be 
pursued in Broward County, Florida, not Utah. (R. 14-23.) 
In response to Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, Trillium 
argued (1) that Utah substantive law applies to this action; 
(2) that even if Florida substantive law applies to this action 
Utah procedural law applies; and (3) that since Utah procedural 
law, not Florida procedural law, applies, Broward County could be 
sued in Utah. (R. 148-60.) In its reply memorandum, Broward 
County addressed the arguments in Trillium1s response memorandum by 
showing that even if the court were to look to Utah law (which 
Trillium claimed applies to this case), this case should be 
dismissed. First, a Utah venue statute requires a suit against a 
county to be commenced in that county. Second, under the principle 
of comity, which is part of Utah law, actions against Broward 
County must be pursued in Broward County, not Utah. (R. 165-74.) 
After Broward County filed its reply memorandum, Trillium 
submitted to the trial court a ten-page supplemental "surreply" 
memorandum that also opposed Broward Countyfs Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 240-50.) Although a surreply memorandum is not authorized by 
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applicable rules, Broward County chose not to object to Trillium1s 
surreply memorandum, choosing instead to focus the trial court's 
attention on the main issue—whether a political subdivision of the 
State of Florida was properly sued in, and should remain a 
defendant in, a Utah court. (See R. 253.) 
In an apparent attempt to divert the trial court's attention 
from the heart of the issues involved in Broward County's Motion to 
Dismiss, Trillium also moved to strike Broward County's reply 
memorandum in support of its motion. (R. 229-31.) Broward County 
opposed that motion to strike, pointing out (1) that its reply 
memorandum properly addressed arguments that were made in 
Trillium's response memorandum; (2) that it would be a waste of 
judicial resources to grant the motion to strike and require 
Broward County to file a separate motion on the comity issue; and 
(3) that Trillium had a full and fair opportunity to brief all 
issues that were presented to the trial court, including the comity 
issue. (R. 251-53.) 
The trial court held oral argument on February 25, 2000. (R. 
283.) Trillium did not attempt to raise and did not even mention 
its motion to strike at the hearing. (See R. 302 at pp. 2-26.) 
Both parties were accorded a full and fair opportunity to raise and 
argue all issues pertaining to Broward County's Motion to Dismiss. 
(See id.) 
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C Disposition in the Court Belov? 
The trial court granted Broward County's Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 283-85.) The final Order of Dismissal was entered on March 8, 
2000. (R. 284-85.) The trial court made no ruling on Trillium's 
motion to strike. 
D. Statement of Facts 
1. Broward County is a political subdivision of the State of 
Florida located in Broward County, Florida. (R. 2, 15.) 
2. Trillium claims that Broward County entered into a 
contract with Trillium in 1995. (R. 162.) 
3. The contract upon which the Complaint was based was 
negotiated and entered into in Broward County, Florida. (R. 71.) 
4- All bids for the contract were issued from and received 
and accepted in Broward County, Florida. (R. 71-72.) 
5. The contract required Trillium to deliver and install 
goods in Broward County, Florida. (R. 72. See also R. 162.) 
6. Trillium claims the goods were actually delivered to 
Florida, where they are currently located. (R. 3, 302 at p. 12.) 
7. The contract upon which the Complaint was based states, 
in relevant part: 
Applicable provisions of all Federal, State, 
County and local laws, and of all ordinance, 
rules and regulations including the 
Procurement of Broward County shall govern 
development, submittal and evaluation of bids 
received in response hereto and shall govern 
any and ail claims and disputes which may 
arise between person (s) submitting a bid in 
response hereto and Broward County by and 
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through its officers, employees and authorized 
representatives, or any other person natural 
or otherwise. Lack of knowledge by any bidder 
shall not constitute a recognizable defense 
against the legal effect thereof. 
(R. 71, 77.) 
8. Trillium claims Broward County breached the contract. 
(R. 2-4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by extending 
comity to the State of Florida and requiring that this lawsuit be 
pursued, if at all, in Broward County, Florida. Utah law 
recognizes the principle of comity, by which the laws of another 
state (rather than Utah) may be applied and by which immunity from 
suit in this state may be extended to political subdivisions of 
other states. The trial court correctly applied the reasoning and 
relevant factors enumerated in Jackett v. Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), as well as in 
numerous other cases that have extended comity to sister states and 
their political subdivisions. 
2. Utah's venue statute applicable to counties requires that 
this suit against Broward County be brought in Broward County. 
Rather than apply the plain language of the statute, Trillium 
attempts to rewrite the statute or add language that does not 
exist. Courts are required to apply the plain language of a 
statute. 
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3. The trial court properly considered arguments that were 
included in Broward County's reply memorandum in support of its 
motion to dismiss. As is permitted, the reply memorandum addressed 
issues that were raised in Trillium1s response memorandum. 
Furthermore, Trillium filed a ten-page "surreply" memorandum that 
fully responded to all arguments made in Broward County's reply 
memorandum. Trillium was also given a full and fair opportunity to 
argue all issues during oral argument. Reversing the trial court's 
ruling would cause a senseless waste of judicial resources, 
especially since Trillium has fully presented its arguments on all 
issues both to the trial court and to this Court. 
4. Florida substantive law governs the parties' dispute in 
this case; it is therefore more appropriate for a Florida court to 
resolve this case. The parties' contract contains a valid and 
enforceable choice of Florida law provision. Furthermore, a common 
law choice of law analysis shows that Florida law applies. In 
particular, a breach of contract action involving the sale of goods 
or provision of services is governed by the law of the state in 
which the goods are delivered or services provided. Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 191, 196 (1971). In this case, that 
state is Florida. Also, an analysis of the "most significant 
relationship" test points to Florida law. 
5. Regardless of whether the substantive law of Florida or 
Utah applies to this lawsuit, the trial court correctly dismissed 
this lawsuit, either because Utah's venue statute requires that a 
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suit against Broward County be brought in Broward County, Florida, 
or because comity mandates that this case be brought in Broward 
County, Florida. This case was properly dismissed even if Utah 
procedural law applies, since Utah's venue statute requires that a 
suit against Broward County be pursued in Broward County. More 
important, the principle of comity, which applies to both 
substantive and procedural law, requires that this case be 
litigated in Florida courts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS CASE BASED ON THE 
EXTENSION OF COMITY TO THE STATE OF FLORIDA. 
The trial court dismissed this case for all the reasons argued 
by Broward County. (R. 284-85) . More specifically, the trial 
court extended comity to the State of Florida and ruled that venue 
in this case properly lies in Broward County, Florida, not Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (See id. ) That ruling was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
Standard of Review 
Trillium attempts to apply the wrong standard of review to the 
issue of whether the trial court properly ruled that, as a matter 
of comity, suit should be brought in Florida. Without citation to 
any authority directly on point, Trillium asserts that this issue 
raises a question of law. (Appellant's Brief p. 4.)1 
'Trillium cites Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996) for 
the notion that a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
to dismiss is a question of law. Tiede did not involve any issue 
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Trillium ignores a Utah case directly on point. In Jackett v. 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. 
App» 1989), the court held, "The decision to apply comity in a 
particular case is fact sensitive. Therefore, courts have 
consistently found that the decision to apply comity rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court." id. at 1075 (citations 
omitted). 
In Jackett, the trial court, as a matter comity, granted a 
motion to dismiss a complaint in a Utah case after applying a 
California statute of limitations. id. The appellate court 
affirmed the dismissal, applying an abuse of discretion standard of 
review. id. at 1077. See also, e.g., Lee v. Miller Countyr 800 
F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the decision to extend comity 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court"); University of 
Iowa Press v. Urrea, 440 S.E..2d 203, 204-05 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), 
remotely touching upon a trial court's application of the principle 
of comity. The issue in Tiede was whether the State of Utah was 
immune from a wrongful death claim based on negligence—a pure 
legal question. See id. at 501-04. The question of whether a 
trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss based on the 
principle of comity is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See cases 
cited in text. 
Trillium's reliance on Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 
(Utah 1991), is also misplaced. In Pan Energy, a specific Utah 
statute required that foreign judgments that have been recorded in 
Utah must be treated "in all respects" as a judgment of the 
district court of Utah. See id. at 1143. That statute expressly 
precluded treating a foreign judgment differently than a local 
judgment, id. at 1146. There is no statute in Utah that expressly 
precludes application of Florida's venue laws in this case. If 
anything, Utah statutes expressly require that suit against Broward 
County be brought only in Broward County, Florida. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-13-3. 
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cert, denied, (1994) (trial court's decision on whether to extend 
comity reviewed for abuse of discretion); Mianecki v. Second 
Judicial District Court, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1983) (case cited 
by Trillium; holding whether to apply principle of comity is within 
discretion of trial court). Accordingly, an abuse of discretion 
standard of review applies to this case. 
B The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 
Dismissed this Case on Grounds of Comity. 
The overriding issue in this appeal is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of 
comity, ruling that judicial proceedings against Broward County, if 
any, be brought in Broward County. The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in so ruling. The trial court's ruling is correct 
even if a "correction of error" standard of review were applicable. 
As a matter of law and as a matter of discretion, the trial court 
properly gave effect to the law of Florida (or the law of Utah, 
which is consistent) that lawsuits against a county must be brought 
only in that county where the defendant is headquartered. 
Numerous courts in many jurisdictions, including Utah, have 
refused to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state or a 
political subdivision of another state based on the principle of 
comity—respect for the foreign state and its laws. E.g. Jackettr 
supra (dismissing suit against California governmental entity). 
Indeed, the "general rule" is that suits against political 
subdivisions must be brought in the jurisdiction where the 
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political entity is situated. See Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. City of 
New York, 374 A.2d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), cert. 
denied, 384 A.2d 502 (N.J- 1977) (recognizing general rule and 
dismissing suit against City of New York based on principle of 
comity). See also numerous cases mentioned below. 
The principle of comity has been aptly described as follows: 
Comity is a principle under which the courts 
of one state give effect to the laws of 
another state or extend immunity to a sister 
sovereign not as a rule of law, but rather out 
of deference or respect. . . . Courts extend 
immunity as a matter of comity to foster 
cooperation, promote harmony, and build 
goodwill. 
Hawsey v. Louisiana Dept. of Social Servs., 934 S.W.2d 723, 726 
(Texas'Ct. App. 1996) (affirming dismissal of suit against agency 
of foreign state). Utah law recognizes the principle of comity and 
will apply it in appropriate circumstances—such as this one—to 
require that a sister state or its political subdivision be sued in 
its home state. See Jackett, supra. 
There is no dispute about the fact that under Florida law a 
county can only be sued in its home county. See Carlile v. Game 
and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1978); Lake County 
v. Friedel, 387 So.2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Florida 
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc., 387 So.2d 940 
(Fla. 1980); Volusia County v. Atlantic Int'l Investment Corp., 
394 So.2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
Utah law is consistent. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 states, "An 
action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county 
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. . ." The word "may," as used in a venue statute such as this 
one, has been uniformly interpreted to mean "must" or "shall." 
Moseley v. Sunshine Biscuits, 107 F. Supp. 164, 165 (W.D. Mo. 
1952); Willis Shaw Frozen Express v. Diabv, 538 S.W.2d 706, 707 
(Ark. 1976) . Thus, under both Utah and Florida law, a lawsuit 
against a county must be brought in the defendant's home county. 
In this case, the trial court properly relied on the principle 
of comity to require that suit against Broward County be brought in 
Broward County. The Jackett case is directly on point. The 
plaintiff in that case filed suit in Utah against a political 
subdivision of the State of California. The suit arose from a 
helicopter crash that occurred in Utah. The trial court dismissed 
the action and the plaintiff appealed. The single issue on appeal 
was "whether the trial court erred in applying, as a matter of 
comity, the two-year statute of limitations provided in 
California's Governmental Claims Act, thus barring plaintiff's 
cause of action in Utah." 771 P.2d at 1075. The Utah Court of 
Appeals held that comity was properly extended to the State of 
California and that the case was properly dismissed, id. at 1075-
77. 
The Jackett court noted that under a normal conflict of laws 
analysis, the applicable Utah statute of limitations would apply. 
Applying the doctrine of comity, however, the court affirmed the 
trial court's application of California's two-year statute of 
limitations, which required dismissal of the claim against the 
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California governmental entity. Relying on advice from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "It may be wise 
policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for states 
to accord each other immunity or to respect any established limits 
on liability. They are free to do so." Id. at 1076 (quoting 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)). The court articulated 
four reasons to extend comity in favor of political subdivisions of 
other states: 
[1] to give primary regard to the rights of 
their own [the foreign state's] citizens; 
[2] to foster cooperation, promote harmony and 
build goodwill with sister states; [3] to have 
claims against the state litigated by that 
state's own courts; and [4] to prevent forum 
shopping and avoid practical problems involved 
in enforcing a judgment by one state against 
another. 
771 P.2d at 1076 (footnotes containing citations omitted). 
1. Application of the four Jackett factors requires 
dismissal of this case. 
All of the reasons for extending comity that were articulated 
in Jackett support the trial court's dismissal of this case. 
First, applying the law of Florida regarding venue in suits against 
counties gives primary regard to the rights of citizens of 
Florida—and specifically citizens of Broward County—by assuring 
that county representatives will not be forced to divert their 
attention from county business by defending actions in various 
forums in many different states. See K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 
589, 595 (Tex. 1994) (Kansas venue statute requiring suits against 
Kansas political subdivision to be pursued in Kansas advances 
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policy of minimizing litigation costs taxpayers must bear by 
providing state agencies with convenient venue in which to litigate 
disputes) . 
Applying Florida law in this case will promote the Florida 
public policy of allowing county officials to defend lawsuits in 
their home county. This policy is consistent with Utah public 
policy, which also requires suits against a county to be brought in 
that county. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3. See Jackett, 771 P.2d at 
1077 (fact that Utah and foreign state have similar immunity 
statutes favors application of foreign statefs immunity law in suit 
against foreign state brought in Utah). 
Second, extending comity to the State of Florida will "foster 
cooperation, promote harmony, and build goodwill" with Florida and 
other states. Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076. For example, Utah 
counties can and should expect the State of Florida to respect 
Utah laws governing suits against Utah counties. That would 
include applicable venue provisions. Thus, if Salt Lake County 
were to be sued in Broward County, Salt Lake County could and 
should expect the Florida court to honor Utah's venue provisions. 
Utah political entities cannot expect courts of other states to 
respect Utah's venue provisions or any other important Utah law or 
policy unless Utah courts are willing to extend the same sort of 
comity to its sister states. See, e.g. , K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 594-
95 ("Texas should not extend comity to another state so long as 
that state declines to extend comity to Texas or other states under 
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the same or similar circumstances"); Baldwin Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Town of Warwick, 545 A.2d 201, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1988), cert denied, 550 A.2d 471 (N.J. 1988) ("We would want and 
expect courts of such neighboring states to respect our important 
governmental . . . policy by declining jurisdiction in the exercise 
of comity. Our courts should do no less."); Ramsden v. State of 
Illinois, 695 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. 1985) (dismissing suit against 
State of Illinois and noting Missouri would certainly prefer to 
have claims against it litigated in its own courts). 
Hawsey provides an excellent case in point. In that case, the 
court extended comity to the State of Louisiana and refused to 
exercise jurisdiction over a subdivision of that state. Central to 
the court's decision was the fact that decisions from courts of the 
State of Louisiana had extended similar comity to other states. 
934 S.W.2d at 726-27. Had Louisiana been perceived by the Texas 
court as uncooperative, the Texas court almost certainly would not 
have extended comity to Louisiana. See id. 
Florida courts, it should be noted, are cooperative in 
extending comity to other states. See Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 751-52 (Fla. 1967) (holding Florida court in 
action for death of Florida citizen in airline accident in Illinois 
would extend comity and apply Illinois statutory limitations on 
damages). The same respect and cooperation should be extended to 
Florida. 
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Other courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction over a 
sister state or its political subdivision solely—or at least 
primarily—out of respect for that state's sovereignty. E.a.r 
Paulus v. State of South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1924); Ramsden, 
695 S.W.2d at 460 ("Missouri is free to close its courts to suits 
against a sister state as a matter of comity"). In this case, 
there is much more than just respect for Florida's sovereignty to 
support dismissal. There is also a specific venue provision in 
both Florida and Utah law that requires all suits against Broward 
County to be brought in Broward County. 
In short, affirming dismissal of Broward County in this case 
will promote cooperation, harmony and goodwill between Utah, 
Florida and other states. Allowing Broward County to be sued here 
would promote just the opposite. 
Third, extending comity to the State of Florida in this case 
would obviously promote the interest of having "claims against a 
state litigated by that state's own courts." Jackett, 771 P.2d at 
1076. The only possible way to have this claim against a 
subdivision of the State of Florida litigated by Floridafs own 
courts is to affirm the dismissal and require Trillium to pursue 
this case where it belongs — in Broward County. 
Fourth, extending comity in this case and requiring this suit 
to be brought in Florida would avoid the practical problems 
involved in enforcing any judgment—however unlikely—against 
Broward County. For example, even if Trillium somehow were able to 
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obtain a judgment against Broward County from a Utah court, 
Trillium would still have to go to Florida and seek the assistance 
of Florida courts to enforce the judgment. Since Trillium would 
eventually be forced to resort to Florida courts to enforce any 
judgment, it is far more practical and resourceful to require 
Trillium to initiate this suit there, as required by the laws of 
both Florida and Utah. 
The Jackett court also referred to the importance of whether 
the public policies of the forum state would be contravened if 
comity were extended. Id. at 1076. See also Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 
203 ("Special deference should be given to the policy of the non-
forum state when that state's strong governmental policies are 
implicated."). Trillium argues that extending comity in this case 
would contravene a public policy embodied in Utah!s long-arm 
statute. In effect, Trillium attempts to make this case a minimum 
contacts/personal jurisdiction case. It is no such case. By 
filing its motion to dismiss and not raising a defense of personal 
jurisdiction, Broward County has conceded that personal juris-
diction exists in this case. That does not mean, however, that the 
trial court was required to exercise personal jurisdiction. See 
Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 202 (holding that issue of whether to extend 
comity did not involve question of personal jurisdiction, "but 
whether New Jersey should defer to New York, after weighing the 
importance of the issue under policies of each state, and decline 
jurisdiction on principles of comity"); Hawsey, 943 S.W.2d at 726 
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("Identification of minimum contacts, however, does not determine 
whether Texas should decline jurisdiction in the interest of 
comity-"); K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 595-96 ("Identification of minimum 
jurisdictional contacts under the long-arm statute does not 
determine whether Texas should decline jurisdiction in the interest 
of comity."); Liquid Carbonic, 374 A.2d at 1259 (long-arm rule has 
no application to question of jurisdiction over a subdivision of 
another state); University of Iowa Press, 440 S.E.2d at 204 (comity 
extended and suit against subdivision of sister state dismissed 
notwithstanding existence of minimum contacts). 
Furthermore, requiring Trillium to pursue this case in Broward 
County is not contrary to the supposed "public policy" on which 
Trillium relies. Trillium is not denied a remedy simply by 
dismissal of this lawsuit. Trillium is free to pursue this case in 
Florida if it chooses to do so. Florida has a reliable civil 
justice system just like any other state. In fact, if Trillium 
were somehow able to pursue this case to a final judgment, it would 
be forced to resort to the courts of Florida to enforce its 
judgment. Trillium has not made and cannot make any showing that 
it will be denied its day in court in Florida. See, e.g., Simmons 
v. State of Montana, 670 P.2d 1372, 1385 (Mont. 1983) (extending 
comity to State of Oregon and noting plaintiff still had remedy in 
Oregon courts); Paulus, 201 N.W. at 869 (extending comity to State 
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of South Dakota and noting availability of remedy in South Dakota 
courts).2 
As noted above, Trillium also completely ignores the Jackett 
case when Trillium argues that the "Utah legislature [by means of 
the long-arm statute] has removed from the Utah courts discretion 
to grant immunity to a foreign state or its subdivision under 
principles of comity." (Appellants Brief p. 31.) In fact, that is 
exactly what the Jackett court did. The Jackett court held that 
comity would be extended to California, and that the two-year 
statute of limitations contained in California's Governmental 
Claims Act would be applied. On that basis, and using an abuse of 
discretion standard, the Jackett court affirmed dismissal of the 
complaint and held that a political subdivision of the State of 
California was immune from suit in Utah. 771 P.2d at 1075-77. Of 
note, this left the plaintiff in Jackett with no remedy, since he 
could not bring suit in California. Id. at 1075. In contrast, the 
trial court1 s dismissal in this case does not deny Trillium a 
2Even if there were a conflict between the public policies of 
the State of Florida and the State of Utah, the policies of the 
State of Utah should not automatically prevail. Utah should defer 
to the interests of the State of Florida because Floridafs 
interests in having this suit litigated in Florida involve 
governmental functions. See Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 204 (noting court 
might choose to defer to important governmental interests of sister 
state where forum state's interests are relatively less important). 
Accord Lee, 800 F.2d at 1375; Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609 
S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. 1980). Because Trillium has a complete 
remedy by suing in Florida, the public policy of Utah on which 
Trillium relies is insubstantial in comparison to the interests of 
Florida that require suits against Florida to be pursued in 
Florida. 
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remedy. The dismissal is "without prejudice" to the refiling of 
this case in Broward County, Florida. (R. 285.) 
The public policy of Utah actually strongly favors the 
extension of comity in this case. Utah venue provisions are 
consistent with Florida venue provisions in that they require suits 
against a county to be filed in the home county. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-13-3. This venue statute promotes the obvious policy of 
allowing government officials and employees to focus on their 
public duties without being forced to travel to other states to 
defend any number of lawsuits that could be brought. See, e.g., 
K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 595. 
Trillium also attempts to pooh-pooh the Jackett case by 
pointing out that the plaintiff was not a Utah citizen and that the 
case may have involved forum shopping. While these factors may 
have impacted the court's thinking, neither factor was controlling 
to its decision. The trial court in this case was entitled to 
consider all relevant factors and make a judgment as to whether 
comity should or should not be extended. As demonstrated above, 
each of those factors overwhelmingly supports dismissal of this 
case. Furthermore, Trillium1s counsel essentially admitted to the 
trial court that its decision to file this case in Utah was in fact 
a matter of forum shopping on Trillium's part. (R. 302 at pp. 9-
10: "It is unfair to expect my client that if they breach the 
contract they have to go all the way down to Florida . . . and be 
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hometowned down there.") Comity should be extended in this case to 
prevent forum shopping. Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1077. 
2. The reasoning of numerous other cases also supports 
extension of comity and dismissal of this case. 
In addition to the reasons stated by the Jackett court, there 
are several other reasons, supported by numerous cases, that the 
trial court's dismissal of this case should be affirmed. The fact 
that Utah has a venue statute consistent with and similar to 
Florida law shows that Utah and Florida public policies will both 
be promoted by requiring this case to be litigated in Florida. See 
Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1077 (fact that Utah and California have 
similar immunity statutes favored application of California 
statute); K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 592, 595 (Texas court applied 
Kansas venue statute requiring suits against certain Kansas 
government entity to be filed in Kansas, in part because Texas has 
similar statute that serves purpose of minimizing litigation costs 
borne by taxpayers); Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 203 (extension of comity 
and application of New York law supported by similar statutes and 
public policies in New York and New Jersey) ; University of Iowa 
Press, 440 S.E.2d at 205 (comity extended because immunity statutes 
in two states were conceptually the same). 
As noted by the trial court, the bulk of the evidence in this 
case, including the actual goods that are the subject of this suit, 
are located in Florida. The heart of this business transaction 
also occurred in Florida. (See, e.g.. R. 71-72, 302 at pp. 10, 12-
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13.) The contract was negotiated and entered into in Broward 
County, Florida, all bids were issued from and were received and 
accepted in Broward County, Florida, and the goods were to be (and 
actually were) delivered from various locations to Broward County, 
Florida, where they remain in storage. (R. 3, 71-72, 163, 302 at 
p. 12.) The convenience of the Florida forum therefore supports the 
extension of comity in this case. See, e.g., Simmons, 670 P.2d at 
1385-86 (fact that critical evidence and witnesses were located in 
Oregon supported extension of comity and requirement that suit 
against agency of State of Oregon be brought in Oregon). 
Extending comity to the State of Florida in this case also 
promotes good business relationships and commercial activity. If 
Broward County—which conducted all of its business activity 
relative to this suit in Broward County—suddenly finds itself 
subject to suit in faraway jurisdictions, it will be far less 
likely to enter future business transactions with Utah businesses. 
Where possible, Broward County will have a strong incentive to 
avoid doing business with Utah entities, choosing instead to deal 
with businesses located in Florida or in jurisdictions that are 
cooperative in extending comity. See Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1385 
(noting that failure to extend comity to Oregon could jeopardize 
the availability of valuable medical services provided by Oregon 
Department of Health). 
Furthermore, Florida law applies to this case, either because 
of a choice of law provision in the contract or because of basic 
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choice of law principles. (See infra Section IV.) Florida courts 
obviously have a far greater interest—and more experience — in 
interpreting their own laws than do Utah courts. In this case it 
is a Florida court, not a Utah court, that should interpret and 
apply Florida law. See, e.g., Ramsden, 695 S.W.2d at 459-60 (fact 
that Illinois substantive law governed contractual dispute favored 
extension of comity and requirement that State of Illinois be sued 
in Illinois courts). 
Certain cases referred to above are also so factually similar 
that they practically compel dismissal of this case. For example, 
in Baldwin, the New Jersey court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over the New York town of Warwick. In that case--like this case—a 
private corporation brought a breach of contract action in a New 
Jersey court against a New York town. The appellate court affirmed 
dismissal of the case despite the fact that the defendant town had 
sufficient minimum contacts to allow the New Jersey court to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over it. The court reasoned that "funda-
mental concepts of comity and public convenience" warranted 
dismissal in favor of the New York entity. 545 A.2d at 202. The 
Baldwin court weighed competing policies of each state (New York 
and New Jersey), giving special deference to the policies of New 
York, the defendant's home state. Ld. at 203. The court concluded 
that the public policies of both states were "best served by 
exercising restraint in this kind of case." Id. at 204. 
The Baldwin court relied on Liquid Carbonic. In Liquid 
Carbonic, the New Jersey court also declined to exercise 
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jurisdiction over the City of New York, and refused to enforce a 
default judgment entered in a New Jersey court against the City of 
New York. The court reasoned that a breach of contract action 
against a municipal subdivision is "local in nature and must be 
brought in the jurisdiction where it is situated." 374 A.2d at 
1258. 
In K.D.F.r a Kansas governmental entity ("KPERS") loaned money 
to Texas Hydrogen Energy Corporation ("Hydrogen"). Hydrogen sued 
KPERS in Texas, claiming that Hydrogen was unable to sell certain 
land because KPERS wrongfully refused to release its security 
interest in the property. 878 S.W.2d at 591. A Kansas venue 
statute required all actions against KPERS be filed in Shawnee 
County, Kansas. Xd. at 592. The K.D.F. court extended comity to 
the State of Kansas, applied Kansas' venue law, and required 
dismissal of the Texas action. Jd. at 593-98.3 
3Cases cited by Trillium are easily distinguishable and/or 
wholly inapplicable. See. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979) 
(court held only that constitution does not prevent state courts 
from exercising jurisdiction over other states; court actually 
encouraged states to extend comity); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 
738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Virginia police officer caused car 
accident in D.C; application of Virginia's more protective 
government immunity statutes offended compelling policies 
underlying D.C.fs more limited governmental immunity laws); Skipper 
v. Prince George's County. 637 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1986) (similar 
to Biscoe) ; Peterson v. State of Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1981) (offending state's activities—negligently allowing 
juvenile delinquent to escape and steal car—all occurred in forum 
state); Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290 (Del. 1998) (Maryland 
sheriff caused car accident in Delaware; application of Maryland's 
more protective government immunity statutes offended policies of 
Delaware); Streubin v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1982) (car 
accident caused by Illinois1 negligence in Iowa; Illinois statutory 
limits on recovery offended policies of Iowa); Hillhouse v. City of 
Kansas, 559 P.2d 1148 (Kan. 1977) (Kansas City, Missouri had to go 
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This Court should follow the lead of Jackett, K.D.F., Baldwin, 
and numerous other cases by extending comity to the State of 
Florida and enforcing Florida's mandatory venue laws. By extending 
comity and affirming dismissal of this case, the Court would not 
only promote wise policy, harmonious interstate relations, and 
respect for the laws of other states; the Court would also enforce 
a Florida venue law that is consistent with Utah's own venue 
statute, 
II. UTAH'S VENUE STATUTE REQUIRES A SUIT AGAINST BROWARD COUNTY TO 
BE BROUGHT IN BROWARD COUNTY. 
This Court should extend comity to Florida, apply Florida's 
venue law to this case, and affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
this case. In addition, even if comity were not extended, the 
dismissal should be affirmed under Utah's own venue statute 
relating to counties. 
no further than across Missouri River to defend case in Kansas 
City, Kansas); Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057 (Md. 
1993) (court did not even mention principle of comity; ruling was 
based solely on court's jurisdiction, not comity); Wendt v. County 
of Osceloa, 289 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 1979) (court did not even mention 
principle of comity; focal point of wrongful acts was partially in 
Minnesota; multiple suits and inconsistent verdicts could result if 
jurisdiction not exercised); Hernandez v. City of Salt Lakef 686 
P.2d 251 (Nev. 1984) (not a comity case; wrongful acts occurred in 
Nevada; plaintiff would be deprived of remedy if forced to sue in 
Utah); Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court, 658 P.2d 422 
(Nev. 1983) (Wisconsin parolee comitted sexual offenses in Nevada; 
Wisconsin's immunity laws offended Nevada policies relating to 
injurious acts committed within Nevada); Erhlich-Bober & Co. v. 
University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1980) (commercial 
transaction was centered in New York; New York had strong interest 
in maintaining its status as preeminent financial nerve center of 
world by assuring ready access to forum for redress of injuries 
arising out of New York-centered transactions). 
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Ignoring the plain language of the statute, Trillium argues 
that Utahfs venue statute requiring counties to be sued in their 
home county does not apply to counties located in states other than 
Utah. Trillium1s argument is legally incorrect. 
The first fundamental rule of statutory construction is that 
the plain language of a statute controls. E.g. , State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998). A court will not look beyond the 
plain language of a statute unless the language is ambiguous. 
E.g., Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, 5 9, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 12. 
Courts may not infer substantive terms into a statute that are not 
already there. Courts have no power to rewrite a statute to 
conform to an intention not expressed. Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1299. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 is plain and unambiguous. It states, 
in relevant part, "An action against a county may be commenced and 
tried in such county . . . " Trillium would rewrite the statute to 
apply only to a county "of this State." But that is not what the 
statute says. The plain wording of the statute applies to "a 
county." Broward County is "a county" within the plain language of 
the statute just as much as any county located in Utah. 
Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 provides that the proper 
venue for a suit against Broward County is in Broward County. The 
trial court therefore did not err in dismissing Trillium1 s 
complaint. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN 
BROWARD COUNTY'S REPLY MEMORANDUM. 
As an aside from the real or primary issues in this case, 
Trillium complains that the trial court should not have considered 
Broward County's reply memorandum in support of its motion to 
dismiss. The trial court properly considered the reply memorandum. 
A. Standard of Review 
Again, Trillium misstates the applicable standard of review. 
The proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard. 
A court, "in its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that 
its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply 
brief." Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 
(Utah 1980) (emphasis added). See also Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d 
1239, 1243 (Wash. 1995) (holding it was within the discretion of 
the appellate court to decide issue regardless of which, if any, 
brief addressed it) . 
Although Romrell appears to have been speaking in terms of the 
Utah Supreme Court's power to consider arguments raised for the 
first time in an appellant's reply brief, there is no reason the 
Romrell rule should not apply here. First, if this Court has 
discretion to consider an argument raised for the first time in a 
reply brief on appeal, then certainly this Court can base its 
decision on arguments that Trillium claims were raised for the 
first time in a reply memorandum below. Second, the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure specifically prohibit new matter in a reply 
-28-
brief. Rule 24(c), Utah R. App. P. Nevertheless, an appellate 
court has discretion to consider such arguments if necessary for a 
proper disposition of the case. Romrell, supra. This same 
reasoning and logic applies to trial courts. Trial courts are in 
at least as good a position, perhaps better, to exercise appro-
priate discretion on whether to consider arguments in a reply 
memorandum. Furthermore, trial courts are not bound by an express 
Rule of Civil Procedure that prohibits new arguments in a reply, as 
are Utah appellate courts. Thus, the rule of discretion stated in 
Romrell applies with force to trial courts, and, even if it does 
not, the Romrell rule permits this Court to consider all arguments 
necessary for a proper disposition of the case. 
B. Broward Countyfs Reply Memorandum Was Proper. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should rule that Broward 
County's reply memorandum was proper because the reply memorandum 
addressed issues raised in Trillium1s response memorandum. The 
analysis is simple. In its opening memorandum, Broward County 
argued that Florida law applies, and that under Florida law this 
suit should have been brought in Broward County, Florida, not Utah. 
In its response, Trillium argued that Utah law applies, and that 
under Utah law this suit was properly brought in Utah. In reply to 
that argument, Broward County properly argued that, even if Utah 
law applies, this suit still should have been brought in Florida 
because (1) Utah's venue statute requires counties to be sued where 
they are located and (2) Utah law recognizes the principle of 
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comity, under which this case should be pursued in Florida, not 
Utah. 
Thus, Broward County's reply memorandum was proper. 
Trillium1s argument to the contrary is nothing more than a 
distraction from the real issues in this case and should be 
rejected out of hand. 
C. In Any Event, the Trial Court Properly Considered Broward 
County's Reply Memorandum. 
Even if one were to incorrectly assume, for the sake of 
argument, that Broward County's reply memorandum raised new issues, 
the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by considering 
it. Tne purpose behind the general rule that "a court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief"4 is to 
prevent the court from considering issues to which the nonmovmg 
party has no opportunity to respond. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 
1003-04 ^"Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its 
rebuttal materials is improper because the nonmovmg party has no 
opportunity to respond."). See also Crowther v. New York, 692 
N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 ^N.Y. S. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (rejecting argument 
that issue was improperly raised in reply brief since "plaintiff 
had an opportunity to and did respond and both the appellants and 
the plaintiff have fully briefed the issue on appeal"); Boyd v. 
Davis, supra. And, as noted above, the Romrell court acknowledged 
4State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 701 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), quoting State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) . 
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an exception to the general rule when a proper disposition of the 
case requires consideration of issues raised for the first time in 
a reply brief. 
These considerations apply here with force. Trillium had—and 
capitalized on—a full and fair opportunity to address any and all 
relevant issues both in written memoranda and in oral arguments. 
More specifically, Trillium submitted a ten-page "surreply" 
memorandum with its complete analysis of the applicable Utah venue 
statute and the comity issue. (R. 240-49.) In fact, the sections 
of Trillium1s opening brief on appeal dealing with the Utah venue 
statute and comity are essentially a verbatim duplication of its 
surreply memorandum. (Compare R. 243-49 with Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 26-31.) Trillium also was given, and took advantage of, a full 
and fair opportunity to address Utah's venue statute and the comity 
issue at oral argument before the trial court. (See R. 302 at pp. 
5-14, 19-22.) Given the fact that Trillium's argument in its 
appeal brief is a verbatim copy of its trial court memorandum, 
together with the fact that Trillium1s oral arguments to the trial 
court addressed all relevant issues, Trillium is hard pressed to 
say that it had no opportunity to respond to all of Broward 
Countyf s arguments. 
The trial court's consideration of Broward County's reply 
memorandum should also be affirmed because to do otherwise would be 
a senseless waste of judicial resources. If the trial court's 
ruling were reversed and the reply memorandum disregarded, Broward 
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County could be forced to file a new motion to dismiss. The 
parties would have to re-brief the same motion, and the trial court 
would have to re-hear the same arguments on the motion and make a 
decision. The case would then likely be appealed to this Court 
once again. All of that would have to occur even though all of the 
issues were squarely before the trial court and are now squarely 
before this Court. A more wasteful use of time and judicial 
resources would be hard to imagine. For these reasons, the Court 
should affirm the rulings of the trial court, which considered 
Broward County's reply memorandum and granted Broward County's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
IV. FLORIDA SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIES TO THIS SUIT. 
Trillium argues that Florida law does not apply to this 
dispute. Florida law does, however, apply, due to the parties1 
choice of law and/or common law conflict of laws rules. Because 
Florida law applies, a Florida court should interpret that law and 
apply it to this case. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Florida 
law requires that suits against Broward County be pursued in 
Broward County. See supra p. 12. 
A. The Parties Have Expressly Agreed that Florida Law 
Governs the Contract and the Parties' Contractual 
Relationship. 
The language of the contract requires application of Florida 
law to the contract between Broward County and Trillium. The 
contract states: 
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Applicable provisions of all Federal, State, 
County and local laws, and of all ordinance, 
rules and regulations including the 
Procurement of Broward County shall govern 
development, submittal and evaluation of bids 
received in response hereto and shall govern 
any and all claims and disputes which may 
arise between person (s) submitting a bid in 
response hereto and Broward County by and 
through its officers, employees and authorized 
representatives, or any other person natural 
or otherwise. Lack of knowledge by any bidder 
shall not constitute a recognizable defense 
against the legal effect thereof, 
(R. 77.) This passage, to which Trillium agreed to be bound, 
mandates the application of Florida law. Florida law governs "any 
and all disputes which may arise" between the parties. 
Trillium argues that this choice of law provision is unclear 
because it does not mention the word "Florida." The choice of law 
provision does, however, refer to all "State, County and local 
laws, and of all ordinance, rules and regulations including the 
Procurement of Broward County." Trillium offers no plausible 
interpretation of this phrase. The only common sense interpre-
tation of this provision—at least by one who takes the time to 
read it, which Trillium apparently did not--is that the laws of 
Florida shall apply. 
Utah courts enforce contractual choice of law provisions. See 
American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 927 P.2d 
186, 188 (Utah 1996) (questions involving contractual obligations 
are determined by the law chosen by the parties). In this case, 
the parties agreed to have Florida law govern their contractual 
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obligations, including any disputes arising out of the contract. 
That law applies to this lawsuit. 
B. Florida Law Would Apply to this Case Even in the Absence 
of an Effective Choice of Florida Law. 
Florida law applies to this case because the parties agreed to 
apply Florida law. Florida law would apply to this case even 
absent the choice of law provision in the contract, based upon 
general choice of law rules that apply when the parties have not 
effectively agreed upon the law of a specific forum. In such 
cases, Utah follows the choice of law provisions of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws. E.g. , American Nat'l, 927 P.2d at 
188-91 (Utah 1996) (applying Section 188 of the Restatement and 
applying Idaho law). 
There are four important sections of the Restatement that 
would apply in this case in the absence of an effective choice of 
law by the parties. Those sections are Sections 6, 188, 191 and 
196. The text of each of those sections is part of the Addendum to 
this brief. 
Section 191 states the rule that applies most directly to the 
facts of this case. It states that, in the absence of an effective 
choice of law provision, the rights and duties created by a 
contract for the sale of chattels is governed by the law of the 
state in which the seller is to deliver the chattels, unless some 
other state has a more significant relationship to the transaction 
and the parties. Section 196 states the identical rule for 
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contracts for the rendition of services. In this case, the 
contract required Trillium to deliver and install all goods and 
services in Florida. (See R. 2-3, 72, 162.) Thus, Florida law 
applies to this case because the goods were to be delivered and 
installed in Florida. 
Sections 6 and 188 of the Restatement also require application 
of Florida law in this case. Section 6 lists seven factors that 
are to be considered in resolving conflicts of laws questions. 
Those factors are: 
• The needs of the interstate and international systems; 
• The relevant policies of the forums; 
• The relevant polices of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of the 
particular issue; 
• The protection of justified expectations; 
• The basic policies underlying the particular field of law; 
• Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and 
• Ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied. 
Section 188 gives concrete guidance on how to apply these 
factors in breach of contract cases. Section 188 requires the 
Court to consider the following: 
• The place of contracting (which, in this case, is Florida (R. 
71-72)); 
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• The place of negotiation of the contract (which, in this case, 
is Florida (R. 71)); 
• The place of performance (which, in this case, is Florida (R. 
72, 302 at pp. 6, 12)); 
• The location of the subject matter of the contract (which, in 
this case, is Florida (R. 3, 302 at p. 12)); and 
• The domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation 
and place of business of the parties (which, in this case, is 
Florida for Broward County, a political subdivision of the 
State of Florida (R. 2, 15).) 
As the Court can see, every one of the relevant considerations 
set forth in Section 188 focuses on Florida. Florida is by far the 
state with the most significant relationship to the parties and the 
transactions involved in this case. Thus, even if there were no 
choice of Florida law provision in the contract (which there is), 
Florida law would still govern in this case. The fact that Florida 
law applies supports the trial court's ruling that this case should 
be litigated in Florida. See supra p. 23-24. 
V. REGARDLESS OF WHICH STATE'S SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIES, THIS CASE 
SHOULD BE LITIGATED IN FLORIDA. 
Trillium argues that, regardless of which state's substantive 
law applies, Utah procedural law applies. Trillium1s position is 
unavailing for two reasons. First, Utah procedural law requires 
that a suit against a county be pursued in that county. That issue 
is discussed above (Section II) and need not be repeated here. 
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Second, the principle of comity, which applies to both substantive 
and procedural law, requires that this case be litigated in Florida 
courts. 
The Jackett case makes it clear that, in appropriate 
circumstances, comity will require the application of a foreign 
statefs procedural laws. In fact, that is exactly what the Jackett 
court did. The Jackett court dismissed a case against a California 
political entity based on statute of limitations grounds. See 771 
P.2d at 1075-77. Statutes of limitation are procedural in nature, 
not substantive. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App. 52, SI 12, 975 P.2d 939. See also 
K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 595 (Tex. 1994) (extending comity to 
State of Kansas by enforcing Kansas venue statute). 
Thus, it ultimately makes little difference whether Utah or 
Florida substantive or procedural law applies. At the end of the 
day, both Utah law and Florida law require that this case be 
litigated in Florida. For theses reasons, the trial court properly 
dismissed this case with prejudice to the refiling of the case in 
Utah, but without prejudice to the refiling of the case in Broward 
County, Florida. The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Order of 
Dismissal should be affirmed. 
DATED August 1, 2000. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Reed/L. Martineau 
Keith A. Call 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM # 1 
REED L. MARTINEAU (A2106) 
KEITH A. CALL (A6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
F!LED BJSTEfGT COURT 
Thtrcl J-jdic.a! District 
cpJty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
-«Vr LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRILLIUM USA, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 990904664CN 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, 
Florida ("Broward County") has filed a Motion to Dismiss. The 
motion was fully briefed by both parties and oral argument was 
heard on February 25, 2000. Having been fully apprised, and for 
good cause appearing, the Court finds as follows: 
For the reasons stated in the memoranda submitted by Broward 
County and for the reasons stated by the Court at oral argument, 
venue in this case is more appropriate in Broward County, Florida, 
than it is in this Court. This Court should therefore refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, for the reasons 
stated in Broward County's memoranda and for the reasons stated by 
the Court at oral argument, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this case is 
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice to the refiling of this 
lawsuit in courts within the State of Utah, but without prejudice 
to the refiling of this case in Broward County, Florida. Each 
party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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NOTICE OF FZhim 
Notice is hereby given that this Order will be filed with the 
Court on March 16, 2000 if no objections are raised by counsel for 
Plaintiff. Alternatively, this Order will be promptly filed with 
the Court upon receipt (by Defendant's counsel) of the Order 
approved as to form by Plaintiff's counsel. 
DATED this yjV\ day of March, 2000. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
eed L. Martineau 
teith A. Call 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\20225\1\ORDER.DIS 
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Certificate of Service 
Kay I. Brown states that she is employed in the law offices of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant herein; that 
she served the attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL, Case No. 990904664CN, 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
upon the following parties by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope to: 
Mr. Erik A. Christiansen 
Parsons, Eehle & Latimer 
201 South Main, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and causing the £ame to be 
J3 mailed first class, postage pre-paid, 
• hand delivered, 
on the j> -^ day o f March, 2000. 
uP. ^6Un^-J 
Kay I. Brown 
ADDENDUM #2 
$ >V*N8^K QzmkA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,, „ _,_„.„,„ 
PILED DISTRICT COURT 
TRILLIUM USA, INC, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
BROWARD COUNTY FLORIDA, 
e t a l , 
-<* '.•'"-'-"inijrtrict 
MAR 1 0 IW 
Case No. 990904664 
Defendant. 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
February 25, 2000 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DAVIS S. YOUNG 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant; 
Erik A. Christiansen 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 S. Main #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801)532-1234 
Keith Call 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
Salt Lake City, 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
L 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 8460 6 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on February 25, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: Let's then consider the matter 
4 of Trillium USA, Inc. vs. the Board of County 
5 | Commissioners, Broward County, Florida, 990904664. On 
6 this matter, counsel, your appearances, please. 
7 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, Erik 
8 Christiansen. I'm appearing on behalf of the 
i 
9 I plaintiff, Trillium USA, Inc. 
10 J MR. CALL: Keith Call, (Inaudible) 
11 Christensen and Mark Nelson for defendant, Broward 
12 J County, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: All right, and this is your 
14 motion, Mr. Call? 
15 j MR. CALL: Yes, your Honor. 
16 j THE COURT: You may proceed. 
17 MR. CALL: Your Honor, the relevant facts of 
18 this case are very simple. Broward County is a 
19 political subdivision of the State of Florida. It's 
20 near Fort Lauderdale by the way just north of Miami. 
21 I In about August of 1995 Broward County 
22 entered into a contract with Trillium, the plaintiff 
23 in this action. The contract required Trillium to 
24 I supply goods and services to Broward County's fleet of 
25 vehicles located in Broward County. 
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What they were doing was converting those 
gas powered vehicles to natural gas powered vehicles, 
and Trillium was to supply the goods and the services 
to convert those vehicles. 
The contract was created by an invitation to 
bid, which was issued from Broward County. The 
invitation to bid was completed by Trillium, was 
returned to Broward County where it was accepted and 
the contract was consummated. As I mentioned, the 
goods were to be delivered and installed in Broward 
County. 
THE COURT: By whom would they be installed? 
MR. CALL: By Trillium. Trillium has now 
sued Broward County claiming that the county breached 
that contract. We're not here to discuss the merits. 
We deny that we've breached that contract, obviously, 
but at issue here is whether Broward County, a 
political subdivision of the State of Florida, may be 
hauled into court here in Utah based on that breach of 
contract claim. 
A couple of other simple but relevant facts. 
The contract has a choice of law provision, which 
states that Florida law will be applied. 
THE COURT: I'm convinced that Florida law 
applies. 
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MR. CALL: I think Trillium disputes that, 
but I'm pleased to hear that you agree with that 
point, 
THE COURT: It (inaudible) from reading, but 
of course I will hear from you in opposition, 
MR. CALL: Sure. Also under Florida law, 
your Honor, it is clear that a county can only be sued 
in the county where the (inaudible). Broward County 
has to be sued in Broward County. There's no real 
dispute about that part of Florida law. Incidentally 
the law is the same in Utah. 
THE COURT: It makes your argument easy, 
doesn't it? 
MR. CALL: Yeah, if you want to sue--
THE COURT: Maybe what you ought to do is 
preserve your argument for reply. 
MR. CALL: If you'd like me to do so I'd be 
happy to, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. CALL: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you might be 
losing? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'm kind of surprised by 
that, given the case law. 
THE COURT: Tell me why you are. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
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MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, this is a simple 
collection case. It's a simple commercial contract 
made between a Utah citizen, a company that is located 
here, where all of its employees are here, where --
did a commercial transaction with a municipal 
corporation, that was done interstate. It involved 
the rights of Utah citizens, it involved a Florida 
municipality, and--
THE COURT: But everything that was done was 
fundamentally done in Florida. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's not true, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, help me with the 
composition, then. 
MR. 
that's before 
reading 
it all, 
THE 
CHRISTIANSEN: The 
your Honor--
QOURT: I might say 
material, and I will say 
and I have not been able 
affidavit of Jan Home. 
is very 
contract 
! what I'd 
MR. 
clear 
were 
THE 
k like 
CHRISTIANSEN: The 
affidavit of Jan 
' you did give me 
Home 
some 
that I have not read 
to, but I 
affidavit 
that substantial portions of 
fulfilled in Utah. 
COURT: Give me the 
to know is what was 
specifics 
(inaudibl 
have the 
of Jan 
the 
, that' 
.e) . 
Home 
s 
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MR. CHRISTIANSEN: All the parts that were 
installed on these automobiles came from Utah. 
THE COURT: Well, sure. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And were shipped to 
Florida. 
THE COURT: But all the working -- I mean 
that means you made them here or you had them here and 
you took them down there, but all the work you did you 
did in Florida, didn't you? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The installation of the 
compressed natural gas tanks, the conversion kits were 
done in Florida, that's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: But it doesn't really 
matter--
THE COURT: What difference does it make to 
Florida that you assembled the parts in Utah? That 
doesn't -- I mean you assemble the parts in Utah that 
you sell to Florida, Montana, Washington. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The case law says that 
that fact is irrelevant. What Utah's long arm statute 
provides is if a Utah citizen has been harmed by 
another party, they can sue them here. They're just 
like any other litigant. 
What the defendant wants to come in here is 
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they want the privileges. They want to say, "Well/ 
because we are a municipal corporation we're entitled 
to different privileges than every other defendant in 
the world." 
If Joe Smith were a Florida resident and had 
bought these compressed natural gas tanks from 
Trillium Corp USA, it's not a jurisdiction question 
it's a banking question. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: They bought them here. I 
don't think your Honor would have any question that we 
could sue them in Utah as long as minimum contact 
personal jurisdiction were satisfied. 
THE COURT: That's true, but--
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The issue here is a venue 
question. 
THE COURT: Well, I know it's a venue 
question here, but in this case in addition you 
have --if Joe Smith in Florida said, " I want to buy 
these packs out here in Utah," and he comes out here 
to Utah or he even communicates and he buys them here, 
and then he takes them down there and he hires ABC 
Automotive to install them, that's a totally different 
case. 
Florida is coming to you and they're saying 
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to you, "We want these automobiles converted in 
Florida. You bid, and we don't care what the -- we'll 
take the lowest bidder giving us a converted vehicle 
in Florida from wherever we receive these bids." So 
all of the -- and when you say this is venue not 
jurisdiction, all of the business relationship from 
venue standpoint occurred in Florida; am I wrong on 
that? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, you're wrong about 
the interpretation of the law because it is a venue 
question, it's not a jurisdiction question. I think 
your Honor and the other side may be confused by that, 
because indisputable United States Supreme Court 
authority says, "Venue questions are procedural." 
When procedural questions are at issue you look to the 
law in Utah, the forum. You don't look to the law of 
Florida to decide whether or not venue is proper. 
They're trying to get this case back in 
Florida because Florida has an active statute which 
says if you sue a Florida municipal corporation then 
you've got to do it in the county where that municipal 
corporation is located. 
THE COURT: Now doesn't Utah--
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's a venue provision, 
it doesn't bind this Court, it's irrelevant to this 
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Court's consideration (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay/ but doesn't Utah have the 
same statute? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It does, but the purpose 
of that statute is obviously pursuing a Utah 
municipality in Utah. There's a venue provision to 
decide whether that properly should be within the 
State of Utah. It doesn't have extra territorial 
effects. 
This is a venue question and it's a question 
of what is the proper law to apply. The US Supreme 
Court says the proper law to apply is the law of Utah, 
The law of Utah (inaudible) jurisdiction--
THE COURT: Well (inaudible) upon venue. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: --recognizes that this is 
the proper place to sue these guys. Our client should 
not be forced to go clear down to Florida to collect 
$25,000 on a commercial contract. It's perfectly 
foreseeable to these guys that they can be hauled into 
court here. They sent a contract here, they entered 
into a contract with us, they kept the goods that came 
from this state, it is not unfair for them to expect 
to be hauled into court in Utah. 
It is unfair to expect my client that if 
they breach the contract they have to go all the way 
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down to Florida, hire Florida counsel and be 
hometowned down there. It's just not fair when the 
law is simply (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, I don't accept the notion 
that someone will be quote, "hometowned" in a way that 
would be unfair or inequitable to them because I 
certainly would not do that in Utah from somebody that 
was trying a case from Florida here. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's fair enough, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: So I don't accept that. But my 
point of this from the fact situation that I'm 
familiar with, and I acknowledge to you that I'm not 
as familiar with this as you are, but that from what I 
see, Florida basically just offered out to companies 
in this business to come down and create conversions 
of their vehicles, and your people did the work. You 
did it in Florida, you hired people to do it in 
Florida, or however you did it, you sent your people 
down there to do it in Florida, and the County of 
Florida dealt with you there. 
Now why shouldn't you be required to go back 
there to collect what you were willing to do there? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We have a choice of 
forums, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Well--
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's what the 
Constitution allows. That's what Utah's long arm 
statute allows. This is a question about which 
statute is more important, Utah's long arm statute 
which I should read to you, your Honor. It says 
that -- if you'll bear with me a second I'll find it 
(inaudible). 
Utah's long arm statute says, "Its purpose 
is to ensure a maximum protection to citizens of this 
state." Citizens of this state. This is a company 
that is a citizen of this state and is entitled to the 
fullest maximum protection under Utah law that Utah's 
long arm statute exists under the United States 
Constitution. 
The United States constitutional law by the 
Supreme Court says we can bring this case here. The 
only question is what is more important, Utah's long 
arm statute or Florida's internal venue statute. 
THE COURT: Okay, now let me ask you this 
question about the venue aspect of it. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It's a venue case. 
THE COURT: Okay, but this question, suppose 
that -- your position is breach of contract, their 
position may be faulty installation -- I'm just 
12 
assuming. If that's so, where are the witnesses? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The witnesses are here. 
THE COURT: Your witnesses. Where are 
theirs? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: They're here, they're in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
THE COURT: How are they -- you did the work 
down there. They're witnesses who are going to -- you 
had the vehicles down there. Where is Exhibit A, the 
faulty installed vehicle? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: This isn't about the 
warranty of the vehicles. This is about kits that 
were delivered--
THE COURT: That are delivered (inaudible). 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: --which they refused to 
accept and pay for. 
THE COURT: Yeah, they are still sitting 
down there. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yeah, we're paying for 
them in storage down there. 
THE COURT: Right, I know that, but they're 
in storage to be installed and they said they don't 
want them, I guess. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: These are all 
jurisdiction questions, they are not venue questions. 
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Our witnesses are here, we have an equal number of 
witnesses here, they have an equal number of witnesses 
there. We have a choice of forums. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And our forum is we can 
sue in the State of Utah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: There's no constitutional 
prohibition against it, Utah's long arm statute is in 
favor of it, venue law unquestionably is a procedural 
law, and Utah law properly should be applied for 
procedural issues. Utah recognizes that this is an 
issue that can be brought here and should be brought 
here. 
Municipal corporations are not immune from 
suit in states just because they are a government 
entity. If they do business all over the US and have 
vendors all over the US, it is perfectly foreseeable 
and perfectly legitimate for those vendors, if that 
municipality breaches its contract, to sue them where 
they are located. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: There's no dispute here 
about jurisdiction. They haven't raised personal 
jurisdiction as an issue. 
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THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: They have (inaudible) 
contacts with the State of Utah. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Christiansen. 
Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, I have handed you a 
copy of Utah's venue statute that I referred to 
earlier. It says actions against the county -- "an 
action against a county may be commenced and tried in 
such county, unless such action is brought by the 
county," and then a different rule applies. 
Your Honor, Trillium argues that this 
statute says an action against a Utah county may be 
brought in such county, but it doesn't say that. It 
says an action against a county. 
Broward County is a county, within the 
meaning of this statute, and therefore has to be sued 
in the State of Florida in Broward County under both 
Utah law and under Florida's law. 
Now I'd like to address this issue of venue 
just a little bit. 
THE COURT: Wouldn't you think that this 
statute (inaudible) was anticipating that this would 
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mean an action against a Utah county? 
MR. CALL: I don't know that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any reason to 
believe it would not be? I mean do you have any 
reason to believe that it means -- that the 
legislature was thinking about any of 50,000 counties 
throughout the nation? 
MR. CALL: The reason I think that is 
because it says "a county" instead of a Utah county. 
It could have easily said "a Utah county" in that 
statute. 
THE COURT: Do you have any reason to 
believe that it means one or the other? 
MR. CALL: In addition to that, your Honor, 
nothing. I don't know of any case law, I'm not 
familiar with any legislative history that would 
indicate one way or the other. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CALL: Now let me address the issue of 
venue, and I'd like to address this in the context of 
the concept of comity, your Honor, because I think 
this is a very important concept that the Utah court 
of appeals has given us some very specific direction 
on. 
Comity is a principle under which the court 
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of one state will give effect to the laws of a sister 
state, not as a rule of law, but out of respect or 
deference for that other state's sovereignty and that 
other state's rules and laws. Comity makes good 
cooperative sense, especially whereas in this case you 
have two states that have similar laws, a county has 
to be sued in the county• 
We want Florida to promote and enforce 
Utah's laws. On the other side of that ledger, Utah 
ought to promote and enforce Florida's laws. In the 
Jacket case, which was cited to you from the Utah 
court of appeals, the Utah court of appeals gives five 
reasons why comity ought to be extended, and those 
five reasons all apply very -- with particularity in 
this case. 
Number one, according to the Jacket court, 
comity should be extended to give primary regard to 
the rights of their own -- Florida's own citizens, 
namely Broward County. In other words, Florida has an 
interest in protecting its citizens, just as Utah has 
an interest in protecting its citizens here. 
That's particularly cogent in this case 
where the defendant is a subdivision of the State of 
Florida, whereas you have recognized, the goods were 
to be delivered in Florida, they were to be installed 
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in Florida, they exist today in Florida, and the 
contractual relationship as you recognized was 
centered in Florida. 
The second reason is that comity should be 
extended to promote harmony, to promote cooperation 
and build good-will with sister states. Now your 
Honor, when I first read that I thought that's pretty 
mushy, ought (inaudible) cooperation, what does that 
mean? But you know, it really has cogent meaning when 
you read the cases. 
In Texas, for example, a Texas judge -- one 
of the first questions a Texas judge will ask me is 
whether or not Florida is classified as a cooperative 
state or an uncooperative state. If they're 
uncooperative, forget it, they won't extend comity. 
If they're cooperative Texas is more likely to extend 
comity. 
Anticipating you'd ask me this same 
question, your Honor, I did some research in 
preparation for this hearing to figure out whether or 
not Florida is cooperative or uncooperative. 
Admittedly the case law is sparse. I couldn't find a 
case in Florida where a foreign city or county was 
sued in Florida, but I did find a case that's 
relevant, Hopkins vs. Laquita Aircraft, 201 S.2d 743. 
18 
In that case a Florida plaintiff sued in 
Florida for wrongful death, and the wrongful death 
occurred in a plane crash that happened in Illinois. 
Illinois has -- had at that time, I don't know if they 
still do or not, but they had a wrongful death statute 
that caps damages, and Florida has no similar cap on 
damages under their wrongful death statute. 
So the Florida Supreme Court based the 
question, "Do we respect Illinois' cap on damages, or 
do we apply Florida law with no cap on damages?" The 
Florida Supreme Court held that they would respect and 
would apply the Illinois cap on damages in the 
wrongful death case. 
Now according to Texas that would make 
Florida a cooperative state. We ought to cooperate 
and work with Florida and enforce their laws. 
The Texas courts also note that in the 
absence of a contrary indication we ought to presume 
they are cooperative and build that (inaudible) of 
cooperation. 
Further, your Honor, giving effect to the 
laws of Florida promotes business. Now if Broward 
County knows that by entering this contract with 
Trillium that they lose the protections and whatnot 
that they have in Florida, are they more or less 
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likely to do business with people in Utah? That's a 
rhetorical question. 
THE COURT: That's all right, I understand. 
MR. CALL: The third reason indicated by the 
Utah court of appeals to extend comity is to have 
claims against a state litigated by that state's 
courts. Boy, that's compelling in this case where the 
defendant is a subdivision of the State of Florida. 
The fourth reason stated by the Utah court, 
"To prevent forum shopping and avoid practical 
problems involved in enforcing a judgment by one state 
against another." Now that sure applies here because 
in the (inaudible) event that judgment is entered in 
Broward County, where does this case end up? 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
Mr. Christiansen, do you have anything else 
you want to indicate? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: A couple real quick 
points that I think -- since he brought up comity 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yes, I'll let you respond to 
comity. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Really quickly with 
respect to Utah's venue statute, which he started off 
talking about, if you look at the Hamsford vs. 
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District of Columbia case, which is in our brief, it 
involves a very similar situation, they said that 
governs internal counties within the state. It was a 
case that was in Maryland. I think it's right on 
point, I think it takes care of that issue about what 
Utah's venue statute means. 
I think that this Court also when thinking 
about comity should think about what Utah courts have 
said about Utah's long arm statute. Utah courts, 
according to Starways, according to Synergistics, 
which is Marathon Ranching, have said courts must 
exercise jurisdiction over non-residents to the outer 
most limits of the Constitution. That is the purpose 
of Utah's long arm statute, that's what our courts say 
about it. 
In contrast, Erewith vs. Bobber vs. 
University of Houston and Hillhouse vs. Kansas City 
say the purpose of venue statutes are to serve the 
administrative convenience of the state. That 
interest is so much smaller than protecting our 
citizens, the citizens of Utah from harm by out of 
state non-residents. 
With respect to the Jacket case, which was 
the only case that is a Utah case that's discussed 
anywhere in their papers, that case does not dictate 
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that this case should be dismissed on the grounds of 
comity. 
Let me tell you about that case. It's a 
very interesting case. I think if you read one case 
today you ought to go back and read the Jacket case. 
In that case the plaintiff was a California resident 
(inaudible) Utah. The defendant--
THE COURT: Where did the event occur? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It was a helicopter crash 
of a LA County helicopter that happened to fly over 
the water in Utah and crash in Utah. The plaintiff 
was a California resident, the defendant was a 
California resident, but there was a statute of 
limitations problem in California so the plaintiff 
there was forum shopping because Utah didn't have the 
same statute of limitations. 
So even though no one had any connection 
with Utah except the crash happened to be here, they 
came and forum shopped because if they would have 
brought it in California there would have been a 
statute of limitations problem. 
There's no forum shopping here. We could 
have brought this case either way. 
THE COURT: Well--
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We brought it here 
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we're entitled to bring it here because we're located 
here, and because as a citizen of the State of Utah 
we're entitled to the protection of our court system. 
That's why it's here. That case is distinguishable on 
all fours. 
I would say that in closing comity is 
appropriate where you can see that someone is trying 
to unfairly take advantage of a situation, forum 
shopping, special laws, that case trying to take 
advantage of a different statute involving the 
Illinois law versus the Florida law. 
This isn't that case, it's a simple 
commercial breach of contract. 
THE COURT: Well, you say that, but it seems 
to me that every vendor dealing with Broward County 
would know that they -- that Broward County is 
requesting them to come to Broward County to convert 
their vehicles. 
Now your product that's in storage in 
Broward County was shipped to Broward County. They 
refused to accept them, I'm assuming, to allow you to 
install them into their vehicles which would be the 
ultimate conclusion of the agreement. 
So you want to sue them here and cause them 
to come out here to Utah, respond to the damages, then 
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they have to go -- whoever prevails/ they have to go 
back to Broward County and pick them up and bring them 
back here, or pick them up and install them in the 
vehicles, whatever the situation is. 
It seems to me that Trillium knew when 
Trillium got into the agreement with Broward County 
that the whole performance of that agreement was to be 
conducted in Broward County, was negotiated from 
Broward County, and that Trillium, in desiring to do 
its business, desired to sell these items to anybody 
in the United States, and particularly to governmental 
units and entities that were willing to convert. 
Trillium, you say, clearly could have filed 
it in either place. It seems to me that the witnesses 
are more available in Broward County, that the 
agreement was conducted more in Broward County, that 
Florida law applies more to Utah law in this case, and 
therefore if Trillium can do it in both places they 
ought to do it in the forum where the witnesses and 
the defendant -- the normal law is that you go to the 
county of the defendant to file your lawsuit. 
If you have two citizens in Utah that are 
involved in some transaction between them you 
usually -- now I'm saying there can be exceptions to 
this, but you usually go to the location of the 
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defendant. That's the traditional way, 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That would (inaudible) to 
the long arm statute on (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I don't think so, 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The purpose of long arm 
statutes is so when citizens of Utah have been wronged 
they can sue people in the State of Utah to the full 
(inaudible) of the Constitution. That's telling my 
client, "If you do business outside of the State of 
Utah with anybody, even though that business goes back 
and forth from both states, tough, you've got to go to 
another state because you're a company that does 
business all over the US, you can't sue anybody in 
Utah where you pay taxes." That's what that's telling 
my client. 
THE COURT: Usually the long arm statute 
deals with the concepts of minimum contacts, and the 
minimum contacts with the State of Utah are -- we look 
at those ca^^s and we try to see if they have had --
if this has had enough contact with Utah to make it 
reasonable to expect that the parties could know that 
they both should be subject to Utah's jurisdiction. 
Nrv.» my view of this is the greater weight of 
the evidence is that both parties knew that they were 
entering into an agreement in Florida. Now I know you 
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say "so what," basically. You say, "So what, still 
they have the choice." I don't read the long arm 
statute to read that we ought to prefer Utah. I read 
it to say that it will grant Utah jurisdiction over 
many matters with its quote, "long arm," but that 
doesn't mean that that's the better forum. 
In this case the Court finds that the 
defendant's motion to dismiss should be in the same is 
granted. I'll ask you, Mr. Call, to prepare an order 
consistent with the Court's ruling and consistent with 
your pleadings on this matter. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: One point of 
clarification, your Honor, just for the record. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: There was no evidence 
before this Court by affidavit or otherwise about the 
location of the witnesses, and so to the extent your 
Honor is drawing conclusions about the location of 
those witnesses, I think those conclusions are lacking 
and (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, and I accept that. I was 
just telling you what I have observed from the way the 
contract was created, the way the work was to be done, 
and it seems to me that we know that all -- that 
Trillium was transporting these to Florida, Trillium 
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was installing them into the vehicles, giving a fully 
converted vehicle to Broward County at the conclusion 
of whatever Trillium's work was. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'd be more than happy 
just to provide affidavit evidence for your Honor, if 
you would like, about the location of the witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, I--
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think you would find 
that evidence will show, as a proffer, the majority of 
the witnesses are in the State of Utah. 
THE COURT: I'd probably find the Trillium 
witnesses are in Utah and the Broward County witnesses 
are in Florida, is probably what I'd find. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Just for the record, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Christiansen 
MR. CALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, if you'll prepare the 
order, Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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secutive term of five years to life for being 
a habitual criminal in violation of Utah 
statute7 and double jeopardy provisions of 
the federal and Utah constitutions.8 We 
agree. 
Utah's habitual criminal statute does not 
create a new crime, but rather enhances 
punishment for the latest substantive of-
fense.9 As we recently noted in State v. 
Stilling, "Since no crime exists, there can 
be no sentence. Assigning a separate sen-
tence for recidivism does more than en-
hance punishment for the latest crime, it 
penalizes an individual for past convic-
tions." 10 In Stilling, we held that the 
sentence for being a habitual criminal 
should be merged with the sentence for the 
underlying substantive offense to create 
one enhanced sentence.11 That result is 
also appropriate in this case. Defendant 
should receive one enhanced sentence of 
five years to life for second degree burgla-
ry and for being a habitual criminal. 
We vacate the sentences and remand to 
the trial court for resentencing consistent 
with this opinion. 
HOWE, ASSOCIATE C.J., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Justice, concurs in the 
result. 
SYSTEM> 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 76-S-10O1 (1978). 
8. VS. Const, amends. V, XIV; Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 12. 
9. See State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989). 
10. Id 
Arthur JACKETT, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF 
WATER AND POWER, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 880040-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 17, 1989. 
California resident brought suit 
against California governmental entity for 
injuries arising from helicopter crash in 
Utah. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss on limita-
tions grounds, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that 
trial court, as matter of comity, could apply 
two-year, California statute of limitations. 
Affirmed. 
1. Courts <&=*511 
Decision to apply comity rests within 
sound discretion of trial court. 
2. Limitation of Actions <$=>2(3) 
Trial court, as matter of comity, could 
apply two-year, California statute of limita-
tions to plaintiffs tort law claims, where 
both parties to suit were residents of Cali-
fornia, Utah's only contact was purely for-
tuitous one as site of crash, and plaintiff 
had brought suit in Utah only after Califor-
nia statute of limitations had run. West's 
Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 810 et seq.; U.C.A. 
1953, 63-30-1 to 63-30-38, 78-12-45. 
3. Courts <*=>511 
Of primary importance in deciding 
whether to apply comity is whether policies 
11. Id; see also State v. Nielson, 25 Utah 2d 11, 
12-13, 474 P.2d 725, 726 (1970) (trial court in-
structed to merge habitual criminal sentence of 
not less than fifteen years with arson sentence 
of one to ten years to create one enhanced 
sentence of not less than fifteen years). 
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of forum state would be contravened if a complaint against L.A. Water within two 
comity were extended. years of the date of the injury, as required 
A ^ ^ ^-ir*i by the Act. 
4. Courts e=»511 J 
Reasons supporting extension of comi- H i s c l a i m b e i n S time-barred in California, 
ty may include state's need to give primary J a c k e t t subsequently filed suit in Utah on 
regard to rights of its own citizens, to J u n e 18> 1987« L A « W a t e r m o v e d to d i s ' 
foster cooperation, promote harmony and m i s s J a c k e t t ' s suit, arguing that as a mat-
build goodwill with sister states, to have ter o f comity» U t a h s h o u l d a PP^ C a l i f o r " 
claims against state litigated by that niVs two-year governmental immunity stat-
state's own courts, and to prevent forum u t e o f "citations. Jackett claimed the 
shopping and avoid practical problems in- c o u r t s h o u l d a PP^ U t a h ' s four-year tort 
volved in enforcing judgment by one state s t a t u t e o f Imitations, Utah Code Ann. 
against another. § 78-12-25 (1987), as under normal conflict 
of laws analysis the statute of limitations 
of the forum governs. The trial court 
William W. Downes, Jr., argued, Winder agreed with L.A. Water and dismissed 
& Haslam, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and Jackett's complaint, 
appellant The sing-le issue on appeal is whether the 
Robert W. Brandt and Michael P. Zac- trial court erred in applying, as a matter of 
cheo, argued, Richards, Brandt, Miller & comity, the two-year statute of limitations 
Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and provided in California's Governmental 
respondent. Claims Act, thus barring plaintiffs cause 
of action in Utah. We note at the outset 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and that this is an issue of first impression in 
ORME, JJ. Utah. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The trial court granted respondent Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power's 
("L.A. Water") motion to dismiss appellant 
Arthur Jackett's ("Jackett") complaint 
Jackett appeals from this decision, claiming 
the trial court abused its discretion in ap-
plying, as a matter of comity, the two-year 
statute of limitations found in California's 
governmental immunity statute. We af-
firm. 
PACTS 
On April 25, 1985, Jackett was injured 
when the helicopter in which he was riding 
made an emergency landing near Cedar 
City, Utah. The helicopter was owned and 
operated by L.A. Water, a California gov-
ernmental entity. Jackett, a resident of 
California, claims his injuries were caused 
by L.A. Water's negligent maintenance and 
operation of the helicopter. Jackett filed a 
timely notice of claim, under California's 
Governmental Claims Act, but failed to file 
COMITY 
[1] The decision to apply comity in a 
particular case is fact sensitive. There-
fore, courts have consistently found that 
the decision to apply comity rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. See 
Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 
99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (1983), cert 
dismissed, 464 U.S. 806, 104 S.Ct 195, 78 
L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Robertson v. Estate of 
McKnight, 591 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex.Civ. 
App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 609 
S.W.2d 534 (Tex.1980); Nowell v. Nowell, 
408 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.Civ.App. 1966), 
cert denied, 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct 53, 19 
L.Ed.2d 116 (1967). 
[2] Jackett argues that because Utah's 
borrowing statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-45 (1987), and Governmental Im-
munity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to 
-38 (1986), are inapplicable, the trial court 
was required to apply Utah's four-year tort 
statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25 (1987). Jackett cites authority 
supporting the proposition that under a 
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general conflict of laws analysis, the limita-
tions period of the forum applies. See, e.g., 
Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 
1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 
397, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981); McGinn v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424 
(Utah 1974), overruled on other grounds, 
Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n., 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). 
Although we agree with Jackett's analysis, 
the trial court may, nevertheless, apply the 
discretionary doctrine of comity to avoid 
the result otherwise compelled by a general 
conflict of laws analysis. 
The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled that while the full faith and credit 
clause does not require it to do so, a forum 
state may extend sovereign immunity to a 
sister state as a matter of comity. Nevada 
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-27, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 
1188-91, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). "It may be 
wise policy, as a matter of harmonious 
interstate relations, for states to accord 
each other immunity or to respect any es-
tablished limits on liability. They are free 
to do so." Id. 99 S.Ct at 1191. Thus, it is 
within the the sound discretion of a state to 
decide whether to extend sovereign immu-
nity in a particular case. 
Exercising this discretion, several state 
and federal courts have acknowledged a 
sister state's sovereign immunity under the 
principle of comity. See, e.g., Lee v. Miller 
County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 
1986) (court upheld a Texas court's choice 
to grant an Arkansas county immunity 
from suit as a matter of comity in an action 
involving a helicopter crash which injured a 
Texas resident); Ramsden v. Illinois, 695 
S.W.2d 457 (Mo.1985) (Missouri court de-
clined to assert jurisdiction in an action 
brought against an Illinois state mental 
health center by Missouri residents alleg-
ing breach of contract and fraudulent mis-
representation); Simmons v. Montana, 
1. But see Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (1983), and 
Ehrlich-Bober 6t Co. v. University of Houston, 49 
N.Y.2d 574, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 404 N.E.2d 726 
(1980), both of which affirmed the trial court's 
discretionary decision not to apply a sister 
state's sovereign immunity law as a matter of 
comity. 
206 Mont. 264, 670 P.2d 1372 (1983) (Mon-
tana court declined to assert jurisdiction 
against the state of Oregon in a medical 
malpractice action); Paulus v. South Da-
kota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924) 
(North Dakota court refused to assume 
jurisdiction where a South Dakota resident 
was injured while working in a North Da-
kota coal mine); Newberry v. Georgia 
Deft of Indus, and Trade, 286 S.C. 574, 
336 S.E.2d 464 (1985) (South Carolina court 
decided to respect Georgia's sovereign im-
munity and held that Georgia could not be 
sued in tort in South Carolina).1 
[3] Courts have focused on a variety of 
public policy concerns in determining 
whether to extend comity in a particular 
case. Of primary importance is whether 
the public policies of the forum state would 
be contravened if comity were extended. 
Head v. Platte County, Missouri, 242 Kan. 
442, 749 P.2d 6, 10 (1988); Robertson v. 
Estate ofMcKnight, 591 S.W.2d 639, 642 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1979). 
[4] Other reasons articulated by courts 
for extending comity include: to give pri-
mary regard to the rights of their own 
citizens;2 to foster cooperation, promote 
harmony and build goodwill with sister 
states;3 to have claims against a state liti-
gated by that state's own courts;4 and to 
prevent forum shopping and avoid practical 
problems involved in enforcing a judgment 
by one state against another.5 
Applying the foregoing principles, we 
find the trial court—far from abusing its 
discretion by declining to assert jurisdiction 
over L.A. Water under the doctrine of com-
ity—ruled in a manner which was fair, just, 
and abundantly sensible. There are three 
independent grounds supporting our con-
clusion. 
2. See, e.g., Head, 749 P.2d at 10; Robertson, 591 
S.W.2d at 642. 
3. Lee, 800 F.2d at 1378. 
4. Ramsden, 695 S.W.2d at 460. 
5. Newberry, 336 S.E.2d at 465. 
STATE v. WILSON 
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First, both California and Utah have sim-
ilar immunity statutes, each with a two-
year limitations period. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-13, -15 (1986). Thus, the 
court was applying a statute of limitations 
consonant with Utah public policy; such a 
statute would be applied to Utah govern-
mental entities sued in Utah as well as 
California entities sued in California. As 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
stated under similar circumstances: 
Both states have a policy in favor of 
some form of immunity in a situation 
such as this. We do not believe that the 
fortuity of an Arkansas county being 
involved in a helicopter crash in Texas is 
an appropriate occasion to circumscribe 
the clear intent of lawmakers in both 
Texas and Arkansas. 
Lee, 800 F.2d at 1379. 
Second, Utah has little interest in litigat-
ing this dispute. Mr. Jackett is a Califor-
nia resident and L.A. Water is a California 
governmental entity. The fortuitous occur-
rence of the crash in Utah is not a compel-
ling reason to accept jurisdiction. Mr. 
Jackett's actions in this case parallel the 
actions of the plaintiff in Paulus v. South 
Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924), 
where the North Dakota court refused to 
assume jurisdiction on comity grounds, and 
required the plaintiff to seek relief in the 
courts of his own state. Id. 201 N.W. at 
870. 
Finally, extending comity in this case 
prevents forum shopping. Soon after Mr. 
Jackett was injured he filed a timely notice 
of claim as required by California's Govern-
mental Claims Act. It was only after Mr. 
Jackett missed California's two-year stat-
ute of limitations, and thus, was foreclosed 
from suing in California that he filed his 
claim in Utah. Allowing Mr. Jackett to 
pursue his claim in our courts would open 
the door to other tardy out-of-state plain-
tiffs searching for a more favorable forum. 
See Newberry, 336 S.E.2d at 465. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
applying the doctrine of comity to foreclose 
Mr. Jackett's suit. Accordingly, the trial 
court's decision is affirmed. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
| KEY MUMBtK SYST£H> 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Louis E. WILSON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880103-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 29, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted of sexual 
abuse of a child. Judgment was entered in 
the Second District Court, Weber County, 
John F. Wahlquist, J., and defendant ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., 
held that (1) trial judge committed harm-
less error by permitting wife of defendant 
to testify against him; (2) trial court's re-
fusal to excuse prospective juror for cause 
was not error, and (3) prosecution could 
amend information to specify different date 
of offense. 
Affirmed. 
1. Witnesses «=»36 
State constitutional provision granting 
witness absolute privilege not to be "com-
pelled" to testify against his or her spouse 
does not give witness spouse a right to 
testify, and thus does not render unconsti-
tutional statute granting the testimonial 
privilege to defendant spouse. Const Art 
1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(1). 
2. Criminal Law *»1170VW1) 
Error in permitting wife to testify 
against husband in sexual abuse of child 
case was harmless, where evidence of wife 
was cumulative to clear and consistent tes-
ADDENDUM #4 
PLACE OF TRIAL - VENUE 78-13-3 
cause claimed title to property located in County, 90 Utah 347. 61 P2d 624 (1936). 
county other than one in which suit brought did Action for rescission of contract for sale of 
not divest court of junsdiction, nor of right to real property on grounds of fraud or mistake is 
try and determine title to property in such
 n o t one in which gravamen of action is deter-
county Barber v Anderson, 73 Utah 357. 274 P mination of right or interest in real property; 
136 (1929). hence court did not err in refusing change of 
Action to foreclose mortgage is properly venue to county in which real property was 
brought m county where the land is situated located Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 2 
upon which the foreclosure is sought. First
 U t a h 2d 309, 273 P2d 168, 46 A.L.R.2d 887 
Natl Bank v. Boley, 90 Utah 341, 61 P2d 621 (1954). 
(1936); Boley v District Court ex rel. Morgan 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 10 et „ A.L.R — Venue of damage action for breach 
seq. of real estate sales contract, 8 A.L.R.3d 489. 
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 26 et seq. Key Numbers. - Venue <*=> 5.1 to 5.3. 
78-13-2. Actions to recover fines or penalties — Against 
public officers. 
Actions for the following causes shall be tried in the county where the cause, 
or some part thereof, arose, subject to the like power of the court to change the 
place of trial: 
(1) For the recovery of a fine, penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute, 
except that, when it is imposed for an offense committed on a lake, river or 
other stream of water situated in two or more counties, the action may be 
brought in any county, bordering on such lake, river or stream opposite to 
the place where the offense was committed. 
(2) Except as otherwise specifically provided, against a public officer, or 
person especially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by him 
in virtue of his office, or against a person who by his command or in his aid 
does anything touching the duties of such officer. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 5 1» C. 1943, Limitation of actions against public officers, 
Supp., 104-13-2. § 78-12-24. 
Cross-References. — Governmental Immu-
nity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike, 30 
Predecessor section did not violate former Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905;. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 63A Am. Jur 2d Public C.J.S. - 92 C J S Venue § 51 et seq. 
Officers and Employees § 527; 77 Am. Jur. 2d Key Numbers. - Venue o 9, 11 
Venue § 24. 
78-13-3. Actions against a county. 
An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county, 
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be commenced 
and tried in any county not a party thereto. 
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 5 1; C. 1943, Limitation of action against county, § 78-12-
Supp., 104-13-3. 30. 
Cross-References. — Governmental Immu-
nity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike, 30 
Predecessor section did not violate former Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal C.J.S. - 20 C.J.S. Counties § 326. 
Corporations, Counties and Other Political Key Numbers. — Counties ^» 215. 
Subdivisions §§ 855 to 857. 
78-13-4. Actions on written contracts. 
When the defendant has signed a contract in the state to perform an 
obligation, an action on the contract may be commenced and tried in the 
following venues: 
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in real property securing a 
consumer's obligation, the action may be brought only in the county where 
the real property is located or where the defendant resides. 
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than under Subsection (1) may 
be brought in the county where such obligation is to be performed, the 
contract was signed, or in which the defendant resides. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 5 1; C. 1943, Written contracts, limitation of action, § 78-
Supp., 104-13-4; 1990, ch. 194, 8 1. 12-23. 
Cross-References. — Oral contracts, limi-
tation of action, § 78-12-25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS implication of those terms. Palfreyman v. 
TVueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943). 
Constitutionality. 
Place of performance. Plaintiff's option. 
Plaintiffs option. Party bringing the action has the option to 
Specific actions. choose the county of contracted performance, or 
Transfer of cause to proper county. the county of residence of defendant, if he 
C ft t' H*v resides in a different county from that of agreed 
< i?S J 1 U 1<>n .* J-J .. • t w e performance, in which to lodge his venue. Floor 
Predecessor section did not violate former v
 M h u Q 6 U t a h 2 Q p 2 d ^ { 1 9 3 5 ) 
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike, 30
 n ,c m_ IACTT*. U >«CO l i o o o j 
Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905). But see Brown v. ™ ^ ™ * ? « « « " « n . 1 0 / " ^ t 6 ? ' " 2 f a 2 d 
Bach, 17 Utah 435, 53 P. 991 (1898). f JZ " ^ f ^ ^ " * H o * ' 1 0 9 U t a h 1 8 6 ' 
lo7 r.Zd H ily4o). 
Place of performance. Where contract performance was due in Salt 
Mere reference to residence or place of busi- Lake County and defendants resided in Cache 
ness in writing, having no reference to place of County, plaintiff had the option of suing defen-
performance, is not sufficient to bring writing dants on the contract in either Salt Lake or 
within this section. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah Cache County; trial court did not have preroga-
203, 41 R2d 281 (1935). tive to grant defendant's motion for change of 
For the purpose of venue, the place where the venue to Cache County where plaintiff had 
defendant is to perform the obligation must be chosen to sue in Salt Lake County. Walker 
determinable from either the express terms of Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, 631 P.2d 860 (Utah 
the written agreement or from the necessary 1981). 
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§ 5 CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 1 
Conflict of Laws than in most other areas of the law, and it 
seems probable that this trend will continue. As experience 
accumulates, some existing Conflict of Laws rules may be mod-
ified and additional rules may be devised in order to cover nar-
rower situations with greater precision and definiteness. The 
extent to which there have been changes in Conflict of Laws 
rules since the appearance of the original Restatement of this 
Subject is indicated in the various Sections and in the Reporter's 
Notes. 
d. Underlying policies. The policies reflected, by Conflict 
of Laws rules are essentially of two kinds: those which underlie 
the particular local law rules at issue and those which underlie 
multistate situations in general. An important objective in 
any choice-of-law case is to accommodate in the best way pos-
sible the policities underlying the potentially applicable local 
law rules of the states involved. Since multistate situations 
give rise to peculiar policies of their own, Conflict of Laws rules 
should reflect these policies. 
Important factors underlying rules of choice of law are 
discussed in § 6. 
§ 6 . Choice-of-Law Principles 
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will 
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of 
law. 
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors rele-
vant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international 
systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states 
and the relative interests of those states in the de-
termination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular 
field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of re-
sult, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of 
the law to be applied. 
&•• Appendix for Court Citation and Crogi R«f«rono«s 
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ADDENDUM #6 
Ch. 8 CONTRACTS § 188 
Comment h: The cases general- Comment i: For a case sug-
ly support the view that it is the gesting that the parties may 
local law of the state chosen by choose a special law to govern the 
the parties that should be applied, validity of an arbitration clause 
Two exceptional cases to the con- contained in an agreement, see 
tary are Duskin v. Pennsylvania- Matter of Electronic & Missile 
Central Airlines Corp., supra, and Facilities, Inc., N.Y.L.J. 12/26/62, 
Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus p. 10, col. 5. 
Shipping Co., Ltd., supra. 
§ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by 
the Parties 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to 
an issue in contract are determined by the local law of 
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction and the par-
ties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the 
parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into ac-
count in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the 
law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the con-
tract, and 
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of in-
corporation and place of business of the par-
ties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their 
relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the 
place of performance are in the same state, the local 
law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203. 
Comment: 
a. Scope of section. The rule of this Section applies in all 
situations where there has not been an effective choice of the 
applicable law by the parties (see § 187). 
See Appendix for Court Citation and Cross References 
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ADDENDUM #7 
§ 190 CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 8 
110-117(1950); Stumberg, Con- 1963); Note, 38 Tulane L.Rev. 
flict of Laws 342-353 (3d ed. 726, 732 C1964). 
§ 191. Contracts to Sell Interests in Chattel 
The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest 
in a chattel and the rights created thereby are deter-
mined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by 
the parties, by the local law of the state where under 
the terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the 
chattel unless, with respect to the particular issue, some 
other state has a more significant relationship under the 
principles stated in § 6 .to the transaction and the par-
ties, in which event the local law of the other state will 
be applied. 
Comment: 
a. Distinction between contract and transfer. A distinc-
tion must here be drawn between a contract for the sale of an 
interest in a chattel and the actual transfer of such an interest. 
The validity of a contract to sell an interest in a chattel, and 
the rights created thereby, are determined by the local law of 
the state selected by application of the rule of this Section. On 
the other hand, whether the contract operates as an actual 
transfer of an interest in the chattel depends upon the law se-
lected by application of the rules of §§ 244-245. A contract to 
sell an interest in a chattel may be valid as a contract but in-
operative as a transfer, or, in the alternative, it may be invalid 
as a contract but operative as a transfer. 
6. Scope of section. The law selected by application of 
the present rule determines such questions as whether the con-
tract is void or voidable because of the illegality of the con-
sideration, whether the contract can be rescinded because of the 
buyer's insolvency or of the seller's failure to comply with cer-
tain of the contract's provisions, whether the seller's nonde-
livery is excused by the buyer's failure to procure a proper 
letter of credit, whether the loss of goods in transit is at the 
risk of the seller or buyer, whether an option to buy has been 
effectively exercised by the buyer, whether the buyer can re-
cover the profits he would have made if the seller had per-
formed the contract, whether there has been a breach of war-
ranty, express or implied, by the seller, and whether acceptance 
of the goods by the buyer is a bar to an action by him for breach 
of warranty. 
See Appendix for Court Citation and Crotf References 
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ADDENDUM #8 
Ch. 8 CONTRACTS § 196 
REPORTER'S NOTE 
The great majority of the cases 
in this area involve the issue of 
usury, as to which see § 203. 
Where usury was not in issue, 
the few cases in point have ap-
plied the local law of the place of 
repayment in situations where the 
contract required that payment be 
made in a single state. See e. g., 
Crews v. Mutual Ben. Life Insur-
ance Co., 104 Ind.App. 183, 8 N.E. 
2d 390 (1937). In most of these 
cases the plaoe of repayment coin-
cided with that in which the con-
tract was made. In one case the 
local law of the place of repay-
ment was applied even though the 
contract had been made in another 
state. Gregg v. Fitzpatrick, 54 
Ga.App. 303, 187 S.E. 730 (1936). 
Comment e: See Zimmerman v. 
Hicks, 7 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1925), 
aff'd sub nom. Zimmerman v. 
Sutherland, 274 U S . 253 (1927). 
The Uniform Commercial Code 
provides in § 4-102 that the lia-
bility of a bank "for action or 
non-action with respect to any 
item handled by it for purpose of 
presentment, payment or collec-
tion is governed by the law of the 
place where the bank is located." 
The reference, presumably, is to 
the local law of the bank's loca-
tion, since in other sections, where 
a reference to the whole law is in-
tended, the authors of the Code 
expressly state this fact. Cf. §§ 
1-105 and 9-103. 
See generally, Batiffol, Les 
Conflits de Lois en Matiere de 
Contrats 198-207 (1938) and 3 
Rabel, Conflict of Laws 7, 16 
(1950). 
§ 1 9 6 . Contracts for the Rendition of Services 
The validity of a contract for the rendition of services 
and the rights created thereby are determined, in the 
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by 
the local law of the state where the contract requires 
that the services, or a major portion of the services, be 
rendered, unless, with respect to the particular issue, 
some other state has a more significant relationship un-
der the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and 
the parties, in which the event the local law of the 
other state will be applied. 
Comment: 
a. Scope of section. The rule of this Section applies to 
contracts for the rendition of services whether these are to be 
rendered by the contracting party himself or by others in his 
behalf. The rule applies to contracts with servants, independent 
contractors and agents and with persons exercising a public pro-
fession, as lawyers, doctors, brokers, commission agents and fac-
tors. 
Se« Appendix for Court Citation and Crois R«f«r«nc«i 
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